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CHAD P. BOWN and RACHEL MCCULLOCH*
This paper focuses on the adjustment environment in the United States as set out
by the active U.S. trade remedy laws (antidumping, countervailing duties, and
safeguards) and the Trade Adjustment Assistance program. We document U.S.
industries’ use of these various laws and relate industry use of trade policies to
import competition and revealed comparative advantage. We also examine poten-
tial effects of U.S. trade policies on adjustment to shifting comparative advantage
and give examples of industry outcomes. An important conclusion is that trade
policies delaying industry adjustment can promote new entry into the domestic
industry and thereby increase rather than alleviate the pressure on existing plants
and workers. [JEL F13, F14, F15]
Adjustment to changing conditions of international trade . . . generally
involves decisions in which the costs of adjustment must be weighed
against the expected future benefits. . . . A principal objective of govern-
ment policy should be to create an environment in which the decisions . ..
lead to a socially appropriate outcome by removing the general distor-
tions . . . that cause the privately perceived benefits or costs of adjustment
to diverge from the true social benefits or costs (Mussa, 1982, p. 117).
When the political power of special interests combines with the perni-
cious effects of the fixed-number-of-jobs fallacy, the result will almost
inevitably be some divergence from the free-trade policies that would
probably best serve the broad public interest. . . . the practical question
for economists working on trade policy is how to keep the damage to a
minimum (Mussa, 1993, p. 374).
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lobalization implies increased opportunities for economic gains at the national
level but also increased disruption of affected industries and regions. In the
United States, job losses and plant closings attributed to import competition or out-
sourcing have brought international trade to the forefront of national politics. With
international market conditions changing rapidly and often unpredictably, the U.S.
policy debate now reflects heightened tension between conflicting goals: adjusting
to new conditions to capture the full potential gains from these developments ver-
sus insulating the economy from new conditions to slow or reverse their domestic
sectoral and regional effects. While other nations must address the same internal
conflicts, the huge size of the U.S. market and the nation’s central role in interna-
tional trade negotiations give U.S. policy choices disproportionate significance
beyond its own borders. AU.S. decision to postpone adjustment to changing inter-
national market conditions translates into losses not only at home but also in the
many nations around the world that now look to expanded trade as a means to spur
their own economic growth.1
In this paper we focus on the adjustment environment in the United States as set
out by the active U.S. trade remedy laws (antidumping, countervailing duties, and
safeguards) and the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program. How does the
United States respond to opportunities associated with changing international market
conditions? Specifically, do U.S. policies facilitate movement of resources into their
most productive use, or do they tend to delay restructuring of industries with declin-
ing comparative advantage? When policies delay restructuring in a trade-impacted
industry, do they have the intended effect of protecting workers in the affected indus-
try? Our surprising conclusion is that policies delaying industry adjustment may
increase, rather than alleviate, the pressure on individual plants and workers.
U.S. trade laws are concerned mainly with situations in which a domestic
industry is adversely affected by a fall in the price of competing imports. However,
import prices may fall for several distinct reasons: (i) unfair foreign trade prac-
tices, (ii) temporary and reversible changes in market conditions, (iii) trade liberal-
ization, and (iv) shifting comparative advantage. The socially optimal adjustment
path, appropriate policy response, and trade remedy most relevant in a particular
case differ according to the reason for the fall in import price.
In the first case, a fall in import price reflects dumping by foreign firms or sub-
sidization by foreign governments, both of which constitute unfair trade practices
under U.S. and World Trade Organization (WTO) statutes. To the extent that such
practices injure a competing U.S. industry, trade law permits action to reverse the
price decline and thus eliminate the need for adjustment.2 In the second case, a
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1In the past two decades, most developing countries have abandoned import substitution in favor of
growth strategies that rely on trade expansion. Although the weight of professional opinion endorses a
causal link between openness and growth, empirical efforts to document the relationship have generated
as much controversy as consensus. Building on earlier research but using an updated data set and other
methodological improvements, Wacziarg and Welch (2003) estimate that, over the 1950–98 period, coun-
tries that liberalized trade experienced an average increase of 1.5 percentage points in their annual growth
rate relative to the pre-liberalization period.
2This policy action may not represent the socially optimal response, especially in the case of dumping.
See, for example, Irwin, 2002, pp. 125–8.fall in import price reflects a temporary and reversible change in the trade envi-
ronment, such as exchange rate appreciation or a downturn in the business cycle.
Firms will then make adjustment decisions on the basis of their own best assess-
ment of future international market conditions. However, because of incomplete
information and other market imperfections, there may be a potential role for
active trade policy to ensure socially optimal adjustment. U.S. and WTO regu-
lations on safeguard protection address this type of situation. In the third case, a
fall in the domestic price of competing imports is the anticipated result of trade
liberalization. Associated declines in industry employment, output, and prof-
itability should likewise be anticipated. The U.S. Trade Adjustment Assistance
program is intended to facilitate the necessary adjustment by assisting affected
workers and firms in industries that face increased competition because of U.S.
trade liberalization. Safeguard protection may also be relevant if actual injury to
the domestic industry is more severe than had been anticipated at the time of the
decision to liberalize trade.
Finally, and of greatest interest for this paper, a fall in import price may reflect
shifting comparative advantage. Such shifts are the norm rather than the exception
in today’s dynamic world economy, and adjustment to these shifts constitutes a
potentially important source of gains both at home and abroad. Loss of U.S. com-
parative advantage in a particular sector, say, steel, means that the opportunity cost
of producing steel at home has risen relative to its opportunity cost abroad. Thus,
the United States will benefit from producing more steel indirectly through trade,
that is, producing other goods or services for export in exchange for increased
steel imports. Comparative advantage rests on a double comparison: of one
domestic sector’s opportunity cost (production cost relative to those of other
domestic sectors), and then of this domestic opportunity cost relative to opportu-
nity cost in other countries. If the United States loses comparative advantage in
steel, this does not imply that the American steel industry has declined in produc-
tivity, or even that its productivity has risen less rapidly than in the steel industry
abroad. It implies only that the domestic steel industry has experienced a relatively
lower productivity gain compared with other U.S. sectors than the steel industry
in a partner country compared with other sectors in that country.
In contrast to the other three reasons for falling import prices, there is little
explicit acknowledgment in U.S. policy or policy debate of the possibility that an
established industry no longer enjoys an international comparative advantage and
thus should, from the viewpoint of economic efficiency, be reduced in size or phased
out. To the extent that a problem of declining comparative advantage is even recog-
nized, the implicit policy goal is to restore comparative advantage, whether through
infusions of capital, adoption of newer technology, or improved marketing, rather
than to facilitate a shift of resources into other sectors. No U.S. trade policy explic-
itly addresses the need to adjust out of certain industries. Moreover, active trade pol-
icy designed to deal with different circumstances is often used instead to address
cases in which falling import price reflects shifting comparative advantage. These
policy actions almost always slow the decline of a domestic industry that is losing
or has lost its comparative advantage. In addition to depriving consumers of the
lower prices and greater variety available through trade, such policies also inhibit
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the nation’s current and potential export industries.3
Our analysis below focuses mainly on adjustment—or lack of adjustment—to
a downward long-term trend in the price of competing imports that reflects shift-
ing comparative advantage. Under U.S. trade laws any fall in import price is treated
primarily as a problem rather than an opportunity. Although trade laws offer a pol-
icy response to each of the other situations in which a domestic industry is harmed
by a decline in import prices, no trade law is aimed directly at promoting the socially
beneficial adjustment to shifting comparative advantage. Because U.S. trade laws
largely ignore the very real possibility that an industry’s current difficulties are due
to changing comparative advantage, their main objective is to maintain the status
quo rather than promote adjustment to new market conditions.
The absence of a policy aimed squarely at promoting adjustment may reflect
two important economic and political realities about the adjustment process. The first
is that adjustment is costly. Achieving the new domestic resource allocation appro-
priate to changed conditions in international markets always entails economically
significant and politically salient adjustment costs up front. Because wages and
other input prices are not fully flexible, adjustment costs often include losses from
unemployment. Moreover, the process entails significant domestic redistribution.
Gains achieved will be distributed unequally even if adjustment is not complicated
by factor-price rigidities. Both during the adjustment process and after adjustment
is complete, a drop in import prices always creates domestic “losers.” It also creates
potential domestic “gainers,” which include consumers and productive resources in
sectors that are enabled to expand. These losses and gains far exceed the net impact
on national welfare and thus generate powerful political forces that affect the coun-
try’s ability to achieve the potential benefits of adjustment.4
Full adjustment requires reduced production and employment in the import-
competing sector; achievement of maximum gains therefore requires absorption
through expansion elsewhere in the economy of productive resources released by
the import-competing industry. The losers from shifting comparative advantage are
readily identified; losses are typically concentrated in a specific sector and often a
specific region. Although the aggregate gains to be achieved through full adjust-
ment are larger, the impact is widely dispersed, and gainers are less likely to be
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3Although sufficient additional investment can restore an industry’s comparative advantage, at least
temporarily, inducing additional investment through trade policy can reduce national welfare. This approach
redirects capital from the uses otherwise preferred by private investors, including owners of firms already
in the industry. A case for any government policy that redirects investment toward sectors losing compara-
tive advantage would thus have to rest on “distortions . . . that cause the privately perceived benefits or costs
of adjustment to diverge from the true social benefits or costs” (Mussa, 1982, p. 117).
4Within a model of two sectors and two generic factors of production that move freely between them,
Stolper and Samuelson (1941) demonstrate that the factor used intensively in the import-competing industry
loses unambiguously. The proposition is striking in that it does not rest on the usual concerns of industry spe-
cificity or temporary unemployment. But in the short run, some factors are immobile and/or sector-specific.
In a model with two industries, two industry-specific factors, and a third factor that moves freely between
sectors, Mussa (1974) shows that the factor specific to the import-competing industry loses unambiguously,
while the mobile third factor may lose or gain.aware of the link to a change in international market conditions. In terms of wages
and employment, gains will be spread across a number of industries, including all
the industries that expand as the adjustment process unfolds. The domestic political
process is thus tilted toward the interests of import-impacted domestic industries and
especially their workers, and away from full adjustment.5
The rest of this paper examines the role of U.S. and WTO trade rules in facil-
itating or retarding adjustment to a drop in import prices due to shifting compara-
tive advantage.6
I. U.S. and WTO Trade Laws and Adjustment
Of the various U.S. trade laws, two—safeguards and trade adjustment assistance—
seem explicitly intended to promote adjustment to increased competition from
imports. However, administration of these laws often envisions only an adjust-
ment process that allows the domestic industry to reverse its decline. Several other
trade laws also play an important role in encouraging or discouraging adjustment.
We discuss each law in turn, considering first provisions dealing explicitly with
adjustment and then provisions or discretion in how provisions are administered
that may implicitly encourage or discourage adjustment. Table 1 summarizes the
major U.S. trade remedy laws and programs.7
Safeguards
Safeguard legislation was originally intended as an escape clause that would allow
temporary re-protection of an import-competing industry that suffers unforeseen
damage because of trade liberalization. An escape clause in the modern sense
was introduced in the U.S. Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 (Jackson,
1997, p. 179). Recent U.S. safeguards have been initiated under Section 201 of
the Trade Act of 1974. Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
and the WTO Agreement on Safeguards allow countries to impose new restric-
tions if a domestic industry is suffering serious injury substantially caused by
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5If policymakers and voters subscribe to a “conservative welfare function” (Corden, 1974) and thus
seek to prevent losses to any group, this will reinforce the tilt away from full adjustment. In theory, an
active political role of downstream industries could counter the pressure for protection. However, decades
of import relief for the U.S. steel industry suggest that the cost to consuming industries is not large enough
to counter domestic producers’direct interest. Exporting nations may also take an active role domestically
or via formal complaints to the WTO.
6Most of the discussion applies also to adjustment required by trade liberalization.
7While the laws discussed in this paper are concerned mainly with situations in which U.S. firms
or workers are injured by competing imports, Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974 addresses for-
eign practices that unfairly exclude U.S. products from export markets. In principle, Section 301 could
offer a way to promote U.S. adjustment to shifting comparative advantage by ensuring that firms in
emerging export sectors are able to find markets abroad. In reality, most of the industries represented
in 301 cases seem improbable as reflections of emerging U.S. comparative advantage. Both the per-
ceived need for Section 301 and its potential scope have been reduced since the WTO was established
in 1995.rapidly increasing imports.8 The explicit purpose is to allow the domestic indus-
try time to restructure.
Under Section 201, the president, the Senate, or a domestic industry can request
safeguard measures. The president is allowed (but not required) to impose safeguard
measures if certain statutory requirements are met. First, the International Trade
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8Although an escape clause essentially provides for backsliding (increased protection) under specific
circumstances, some economists believe this helps to facilitate and maintain overall liberalization of trade.
By providing insurance against unforeseen damage to the economy, safeguards may encourage trade nego-
tiators to be bolder in their offers of concessions. Moreover, by offering a framework within which a coun-
try may yield to domestic political pressure to renege on certain negotiated liberalization commitments and
yet preserve the integrity of the agreement, safeguards may improve the overall durability of a liberal trade
regime. Hoekman and Kostecki (2001) call these the insurance and safety-valve functions of safeguards.
Table 1. Frequency of Petitions Under 
U.S. Trade Remedy Laws and Programs
Years of Number of 
Program Petitions Initiated
Availability (through May 2004)
GENERAL TRADE REMEDY LAWS 
AND PROGRAMS
Safeguards (Section 201) 1975– 73
Trade Adjustment Assistance
(Department of Labor) 1972– 31,0761
Antidumping (currently Section 731) 1921– 2,170
Countervailing Duties (currently Section 701) 1897– 932
SECTOR- OR COUNTRY-SPECIFIC 
TRADE REMEDIES
China Safeguard (Section 421) 2002– 4
China Textile Safeguard
(Department of Commerce, Office of 
Textiles and Apparel) 2003– 3
Textile and Clothing Transitional Safeguard
(Department of Commerce, Office of 
Textiles and Apparel) 1995–2004 242
Agriculture Special Safeguard
(U.S. Notifications to the Committee on 
Agriculture under Article 5 of the  Hundreds of 
WTO Agreement on Agriculture) 1995– 10-digit HTS3 products
Trade Adjustment Assistance for Farmers and Fishers 2003– 25
(Department of Agriculture)
Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms
(Department of Commerce, Economic 
Development Administration) 1975– 5,4354
Services Safeguard (GATS) Proposed 0
1Data for 1972–1994 from Magee (2001).
2Petitions filed against WTO members only, as reported to the WTO Textiles Monitoring Body
for the 1995–2001 period.
3Harmonized Tariff Schedule.
4Number of firms certified (source: Economic Development Administration records). No data
available for 1979 or for petitioning firms not certified.Commission (ITC) must determine whether the domestic industry is suffering serious
injury caused by increased imports. If the finding is affirmative, the ITC recommends
appropriate measures to the president, who can accept, reject, or modify the ITC’s
recommendations. When broader considerations of national policy appear to out-
weigh the potential benefits of action on behalf of the industry, the president need not
impose a trade restriction, even if the ITC has found serious injury that is attributable
to increased imports. Section 201 specifies the statute’s objective as “positive adjust-
ment to import competition,” where this is defined as occurring either (i) when the
domestic industry is able to compete successfully with imports after safeguard
actions terminate, or (ii) when the domestic industry experiences an orderly transfer
of resources, including dislocated workers, to other productive pursuits [§2251 (b)].
The statute requires that the representative of the industry filing the petition sub-
mit an adjustment plan describing
the specific purposes for which action is being sought, which may include
facilitating the orderly transfer of resources to more productive pursuits,
enhancing competitiveness, or other means of adjustment to new condi-
tions of competition [§2252 (a)(2)(A)].
The representative of the industry can be a “trade association, firm, certified or
recognized union, or group of workers.” Choice of the representative may have
important implications for the safeguard process because different groups may
have complementary or conflicting adjustment incentives and preferences. For
example, workers will not be expected to take advantage of retraining benefits
under TAAif the industry receives import protection and layoffs are thus avoided.
There may also be differences in the interests of firms within an industry, as with
vertically integrated steel producers versus mini-mills.9





• “[O]ne or more appropriate adjustment measures, including the provision of
trade adjustment assistance . . . ,”
• Voluntary export restraint (VER),10
• Auctioning import licenses,
• International negotiations,
• Submitting legislative proposals to Congress,
• “[A]ny other action . . . which the President considers appropriate and fea-
sible . . . ,” or
• Any combination of the above.
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9Durling and Prusa (2003) argue that the primary effect of the steel safeguard tariffs imposed by the
United States in 2002 was distributional; the tariffs provided relatively small gains to traditional integrated
producers but more substantial benefits to the newer mini-mills. Below we argue that temporary trade
restrictions may encourage new investment in a declining industry even when full adjustment to changing
market conditions must entail a drop in industry output and employment.
10Use of VERs has been phased out under the terms of the Uruguay Round agreement.Section 201 allows the initial policy to be imposed for no more than four years,
with a possible extension for an additional four years. But WTO rules allow neg-
atively affected exporting countries to seek compensation in the form of retalia-
tion if a safeguard remains in effect for longer than three years. In practice, the
period of safeguard application since 1995 has been limited to three years or less.11
Despite its explicit goal of promoting adjustment, Section 201 is used mainly
to offer temporary relief for an import-impacted industry. However, the law’s pro-
visions do allow the president to implement measures that directly promote adjust-
ment. These could include either measures to enhance the competitive position of
the domestic industry or measures to facilitate “an orderly transfer of resources” to
other industries.
Special Safeguards
In addition to the normal safeguards provided under Section 201, the most highly
protected sectors of the U.S. economy also benefit from special safeguard arrange-
ments included in specific bilateral and multilateral agreements. These safeguards
are special in that they apply in situations where protection could not be obtained
under Section 201, for example, by specifying a lower injury threshold for safe-
guards or allowing U.S. action on imports only from specific sources rather than
total imports. Such arrangements include the following:
Special agricultural safeguards in the WTO
The Agreement on Agriculture that began the process of bringing policies on agri-
cultural trade under WTO discipline included special safeguards on agricultural
products.12 Under the agreement, 39 WTO members reserved the right to use spe-
cial safeguards on 2 to 539 products; for the United States, the number of products
potentially subject to these safeguards is 189. The special agricultural safeguards
differ from normal safeguards in that higher safeguard duties can be triggered auto-
matically if import volumes rise above a predetermined level or prices fall below a
predetermined level. More notably, safeguards can be applied without evidence of
serious injury to the domestic economy. However, in keeping with their objective
of facilitating progress in the area of agricultural trade, the right to apply such safe-
guards will lapse in the absence of agreement to continue the negotiations.
Post-Uruguay-Round WTO negotiations on agriculture began in early 2000.
Agriculture is a high-priority item on the Doha Round agenda, which is focused on
the trade priorities of developing countries.13 The 2001 Doha Declaration includes
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11If the imposed safeguard is found to violate WTO rules, retaliation can be imposed at the conclusion
of the trade dispute (typically 18 months). This has led to withdrawal of some applied safeguards even
before the end of three years. For example, U.S. safeguard tariffs on steel imports were imposed in March
2002 and withdrawn in December 2003 following a negative ruling from the WTO.
12WTO website http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd11_ssg_e.htm (accessed May
17, 2004).
13Cline (2004) estimates that global free trade would raise annual incomes of the developing countries
by $200 billion, with much of that benefit going to the world’s poorest people. He singles out agriculture,
textiles, and apparel as the most important sectors in terms of potential gains to developing countries;
about half of the total gains are projected to come from agricultural alone.a commitment to comprehensive negotiations aimed at “substantial improvements
in market access; reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export sub-
sidies; and substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support.”14
Special transitional safeguards in the WTO Agreement on 
Textiles and Clothing
Negotiated in the Uruguay Round, the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing15
was intended to terminate the global system of quotas that had severely distorted
international trade in these products for decades. The agreement called for a phase-
out of the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA), with all products scheduled to be brought
into conformity with normal WTO rules on goods trade by 2005; all quantitative
restrictions were to be eliminated by the end of 2004. Article 6 of the agreement pro-
vided for special transitional safeguards on products not yet integrated into the WTO
system. Because the MFAwas eliminated on schedule, problems arising in 2005 and
thereafter fall under the usual WTO safeguard provisions.
Unlike normal safeguards, which must be applied on a most-favored-nation
basis, these transitional safeguard measures could be applied against individual
exporting countries if it could be shown that “serious damage or actual threat
thereof . . . is attributed . . . on the basis of a sharp and substantial increase in
imports, actual or imminent” to trade with an individual member (Article 6.4).
Transitional safeguards were limited to up three years or until the product was
integrated into the WTO system.
Special transitional safeguard mechanism for China’s WTO entry
The agreement setting terms for China’s entry into the WTO includes a special
transitional safeguard mechanism that allows the use of safeguards when imports
from China cause or threaten injury to domestic producers of other members.16
The transitional safeguards are authorized for the first 12 years of China’s WTO
membership, until 2014. In contrast to the normal WTO requirement of actual or
threatened “serious” injury to the domestic industry of the safeguard-imposing
country, the transitional safeguards require only “material” injury, the lower injury
threshold normally used in remedies for unfair trade. Also included in the agreement
is a special safeguard relating exclusively to China’s participation in the Agreement
on Textiles and Clothing.
A textile-specific safeguard mechanism, subject to an even lower threshold,
will allow other members to apply safeguards to textile and apparel imports from
China until the end of 2008. These safeguards can be applied if “a WTO Member
believed that imports of Chinese origin of textiles and apparel products . . . were,
due to market disruption, threatening to impede the orderly development of trade
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14Doha Ministerial Declaration, adopted November 14, 2001. WTO website http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm (accessed August 24, 2004).
15WTO website http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/16-tex.pdf (accessed May 17, 2004).
16WTO website http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr243_e.htm (accessed May 17, 2004).in these products” and consultation with China did not result in a satisfactory res-
olution. U.S. textile imports from China surged after some quantitative restrictions
were removed following China’s WTO entry in 2001. On December 24, 2003, the
United States imposed safeguard quotas on imports of Chinese brassieres, robes,
and knit fabrics for a one-year period.17
Special safeguards in other U.S. bilateral and 
regional trade agreements
Most bilateral and regional agreements contain provisions for special safeguards.
For example, in addition to a generous phase-in period of up to 15 years, the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) allows members to apply special agri-
cultural safeguard protection on import-sensitive crops. Similarly, the U.S.-
Jordan Free Trade Agreement includes special safeguards that allow scheduled
duty reductions to be suspended or even reversed if imports from the other party
“constitute a substantial cause of serious injury, or threat thereof” to the compet-
ing domestic industry.
Trade Adjustment Assistance
Several distinct justifications for TAA proceed from the unequal distribution of
gains from trade liberalization. Opening to trade generates benefits for the average
American that are large in the aggregate but small for most individuals. At the same
time, liberalization inflicts significant costs on those whose livelihoods are directly
affected by competition from imports. Providing TAAcan then be explained in terms
of equity, as a means to compensate losers; in terms of efficiency, as a means to
reduce adjustment costs by addressing market failures; or in terms of political effi-
cacy, as a means to reduce opposition to trade liberalization (Magee, 2001).18
The U.S. TAA program was introduced in 1962 legislation authorizing U.S.
participation in the Kennedy Round of multilateral trade negotiations, as a way to
obtain needed support from organized labor. The initial program offered benefits
for both workers and firms: extended unemployment compensation, retraining,
and other benefits for trade-impacted workers; technical assistance, loans, and loan
guarantees for trade-impacted firms. However, eligibility requirements were enforced
so stringently that not a single worker petition was approved until November 1969.
Even when some petitions eventually gained approval, the benefits were so meager
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17U.S. Commerce Department website http://www.ita.doc.gov/media/FactSheet/pdfs/JCCT_outcomes_
and_signing_descriptions_042104.pdf (accessed August 24, 2004).
18Using data on 31,076 petitions for assistance filed between 1975 and 1992, Magee (2001) tests for
consistency of these motives with Department of Labor certifications. He finds that lower industry wages
and higher industry unemployment are associated with a higher fraction of petitions certified. Both results
are consistent with the equity motive, while the second is consistent also with the efficiency motive, because
reemployment prospects are worse for displaced workers in an industry with high unemployment. However,
evidence that TAA facilitates trade liberalization is inconclusive. In fact, Magee’s data show that higher
tariff protection of an industry is “strongly associated with an increased probability that workers will be
certified” for TAA, suggesting that both types of industry assistance have the same underlying political
determinants.and the bureaucratic obstacles to obtaining them so formidable that organized labor
soon came to denigrate the program as “burial insurance.”
The Trade Act of 1974 revamped the program to ease access to TAA benefits.
As in 1962, TAA served as a political quid pro quo needed to gain support from
organized labor for legislation authorizing U.S. participation in multilateral trade
negotiations (the Tokyo Round). However, the program remained ineffective as
a tool for facilitating adjustment despite its soaring budgetary cost.19 By offering
extended unemployment benefits, TAAallowed import-impacted workers to remain
out of work longer than workers displaced for other reasons. Workers in industries
characterized by a high wage premium (steel, autos) rationally chose to wait to be
recalled from layoff rather than seek work in another industry where wages were
almost sure to be lower.20The NAFTAImplementation Act of 1993 added NAFTA-
Transitional Adjustment Assistance to the TAA program. This special program
was aimed at U.S. workers adversely affected by imports from Mexico or Canada
or by a shift by U.S. firms to production in these countries.
Further changes to the TAA program were included in the Trade Act of 2002,
which granted “trade promotion authority” to the president and expanded preferen-
tial trade arrangements for Andean, Caribbean and Central American, and African
countries. The 2002 law integrated NAFTA-TAA into the main TAA program,
expanded eligibility to additional groups of workers, increased benefits available,
and added a health insurance tax credit. The program, administered by the U.S.
Department of Labor in cooperation with One-Stop Career Centers in every state,
was broadened to cover “trade-affected” workers, defined as those who lost their
jobs because of increased imports or shifts in production out of the United States.21
Also included for the first time were “adversely affected secondary workers,”
defined as workers at firms affected indirectly by the reduced output or exit of
directly trade-impacted firms. The covered workers include those at “upstream”
firms supplying components or parts to directly affected firms as well as “down-
stream” firms performing “additional, value-added production processes . . . includ-
ing final assembly or finishing.” However, despite the change in language, the 2002
law did not extend benefits to one important group of trade-affected workers: those
laid off from jobs in export industries experiencing increased competition in for-
eign markets. Moreover, the program does not cover service workers and thus
provides no adjustment assistance to workers affected by outsourcing in the ser-
vice sector.
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19Annual expenditures reached $1.6 billion by 1980. Political support for the program then waned as
it became apparent that a disproportionate share of the funds was going to workers in high-wage indus-
tries. Moreover, there was little evidence that the program actually promoted adjustment. The Reagan
administration cut funding and benefits in 1981 (Pearson, 2004, p. 88).
20Workers displaced from their jobs even temporarily are eligible to receive benefits, and many such
workers do return to the same employer. TAA has therefore been criticized for providing a subsidy to
employers with cyclical demand. However, the likelihood that laid-off workers will be certified for TAA
benefits may make employers less reluctant to reduce their workforce, thus perhaps promoting adjustment
to changing market conditions.
21The 2002 law imposes restrictions on eligibility for TAA if a plant moves to a country with which
the United States does not have a free trade agreement (Rosen, 2004).The 2002 law also extended coverage to some trade-impacted farmers and
fishers. TAA for farmers and fishers differs from TAA for manufacturing workers
in that assistance is tied to a drop in market price rather than job loss. The program
augments the earnings of farmers and fishers remaining in the trade-impacted sec-
tor, thus aiding only those who have not adjusted to changing conditions in inter-
national markets. TAA payments are based on total production and are equal to
one-half the difference between the current market price of the trade-affected good
and its average price over a base period. TAA for farmers and fishers thus has a
strong anti-adjustment element.
Apart from TAAfor farmers and fishers, most of the 2002 provisions expanded
eligibility and eased access to benefits for unemployed workers. However, intro-
duction of Alternative Trade Adjustment Assistance (ATAA) for older workers
departed significantly from earlier TAA programs for unemployed workers by
tying cash benefits to a speedy return to work. ATAA is aimed at otherwise eligi-
ble workers at least 50 years old for whom retraining may not be a suitable choice.
For eligible workers who find new employment within 26 weeks of layoff, ATAA
covers up to 50 percent of the full-time salary gap between the old and new job
for a two-year period.22Although it represents a significant step in the direction of
promoting adjustment, ATAA is unlikely to solve the problem raised by displace-
ments from high-wage sectors such as steel and autos. Total payments are limited
to $10,000 over two years, and workers earning more than $50,000 in the new job
are not covered.
The original TAAprogram also provided trade-impacted firms with loans, loan
guarantees, and technical assistance. Direct financial assistance was eliminated in
1986, partly because of budget cutbacks and high default rates (Pearson, 2004).
However, TAAfor manufacturing firms continues in a modest program of technical
assistance (maximum benefit per project is $75,000) administered by the Department
of Commerce via a network of regionally dispersed not-for-profit TAA centers.
The program pays for half the cost of consultants or industry-specific experts used
in projects to improve a firm’s competitiveness. In contrast to TAA for workers,
eligibility for firm TAA is tied only loosely to trade impact; a firm may be eligible
if it experienced sales and employment declines “at least partially due to imports”
over the last two years.23 Each of the three project success stories featured on the
Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms website involves a small business that
increased sales and profits by moving into a new niche within the same industry.
Antidumping and Countervailing Duties
Safeguards and TAA assist firms and workers adversely affected by imports or, in
the case of TAA, the relocation abroad of U.S. plants, regardless of whether the
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22According to Kletzer (2001), two-thirds of workers displaced from import-competing industries who
found new employment earned less on the new job; a quarter of those reemployed earned at least 30 per-
cent less. Kletzer and Litan (2001) propose wage insurance covering all displaced workers, not just those
in trade-impacted industries. The narrower coverage in the 2002 law reflects a balance between budgetary
and political considerations.
23Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms website: http://www.taacenters.org/index.html (accessed May
18, 2004).trade impact is associated with unfair behavior of foreign competitors. The provi-
sions discussed above tend to offset rather than reinforce the market pressure for
resources to leave a sector that experiences declining comparative advantage. How-
ever, the statutory limit on the duration of a safeguard and of TAA’s provisions on
retraining, relocation, job search, and wage insurance can be seen as implicit or
explicit efforts to promote eventual adjustment.
In contrast, antidumping and countervailing duty laws begin from the premise
that the pressure to adjust is itself unfair because competing goods are being sold in
the U.S. market at less than fair value. Hence, these laws aim to eliminate the need
for U.S. firms to adjust. In practice, the frequent use of antidumping by the steel
industry in particular suggests that these laws strengthen the ability of industries to
postpone adjustment indefinitely. The link of antidumping activity to exchange rate
appreciation and cyclical downswings (Knetter and Prusa, 2003; and Irwin, 2005)
may imply their use also as a means to counter reversible declines in profitability.
This would have the effect of retaining resources in sectors where the average return
would otherwise be inadequate to compensate for the volatility of profits.
In a competitive industry with high fixed costs and substantial volatility in
demand, one would expect to see all firms selling at marginal cost and making
losses (selling price below full average cost) during business downturns but earn-
ing above-average profits during upturns; average profitability over time should
be sufficient to compensate for year-to-year volatility. However, this behavior pat-
tern on the part of foreign firms exporting to the United States would trigger
dumping complaints. One effect of antidumping is thus to shift more of the adjust-
ment burden in cyclical industries to foreign suppliers.
Notwithstanding the intended role of antidumping as a means of preventing
damage to the U.S. economy caused by unfair practices of foreign firms, most inter-
national economists view the law as offering domestic firms an easy alternative to
adjustment. The ease of obtaining protection through this route is attributable in
part to a shift in 1980 of the responsibility for determining whether imports were
sold at less than fair value from the free-trade-oriented Treasury Department to the
Department of Commerce. Irwin (2005) shows that Commerce was far more likely
than Treasury to find evidence of dumping, a necessary condition for antidump-
ing action to protect the domestic industry. A second reason for the relative ease
of obtaining sector-specific protection through this route is that Commerce offi-
cials can choose among four calculation methods. These include a “facts available”
method based on cost data supplied by the petitioners, which accounts for affirma-
tive decisions with an average dumping margin of nearly 96 percent (Irwin, 2002,
p. 115). Moreover, antidumping enforcement appears to target exporting nations that
have recently gained competitiveness in the relevant industry, especially smaller
countries lacking the capacity to retaliate in kind (Blonigen and Bown, 2003).
Since the intent of antidumping and countervailing duties is to neutralize the
impact on domestic firms of unfair import pricing, it is not surprising that the U.S.
Tariff Act of 1930 makes no explicit mention of adjustment in the import-competing
sector. However, the provisions regarding “sunset reviews” implicitly address indus-
try adjustment. Five years after an antidumping duty or countervailing duty has been
imposed, the Department of Commerce and the International Trade Commission
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or antidumping duty order or termination of the [suspension agreement] . . . would
be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping or a countervailable sub-
sidy (as the case may be) and of material injury” [from §1675(c)(1)(C)]. Thus, if
the affected industry makes a successful adjustment by becoming competitive and
so eliminates risk of future material injury from foreign competition, the industry
will lose its protection through the removal of duties. This provision appears to fur-
ther weaken the already weak incentives for speedy adjustment by offering contin-
ued protection only for industries that are still endangered by imports.24
WTO Rules on Subsidies
The WTO limits members’use of subsidies as well as the actions members may take
in response to subsidies used by other member countries. Subsidies specifically
designed to distort international trade are prohibited.25 Other subsidies are permitted
unless a complaining country can show that it is adversely affected. Subsidies
designed to ease adjustment by facilitating movement of productive factors out
of a U.S. industry that has lost comparative advantage would thus be permitted as
long as they did not (i) hurt a domestic industry in an importing country, (ii) hurt
exporters in another country trying to compete in the U.S. market, or (iii) hurt rival
exporters from another country in competition in a third market.
Given the possible grounds for a complaint, subsidies designed to restore the
comparative advantage of a declining U.S. industry would run a greater chance of
being challenged by another WTO member than subsidies designed to encourage
exit. If the WTO Dispute Settlement Body agrees that the U.S. subsidies have
adverse effects on another member, the United States would have to withdraw its
subsidies or otherwise eliminate the adverse effects. If subsidies hurt domestic
producers in a country that imports the U.S.-subsidized good, the importing coun-
try could impose a countervailing duty.
II. Import Penetration, Comparative Advantage,
and Industry Use of Trade Policies
We have reviewed the main U.S. trade policies that may influence the adjustment
of U.S. industries to changing conditions in international markets. As already
noted, there is no trade policy specifically intended to promote adjustment to shift-
ing comparative advantage, and our review makes it clear that other policies tend
to be adjustment-neutral or even to retard rather than to promote adjustment. As a
rough measure of the relative importance of these laws in shaping the U.S. adjust-
ment environment, Table 1 shows the frequency with which selected trade laws and
programs have been used in recent years. In most cases, the “petitions” number
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24This argument applies best in an industry with relatively few firms and restricted entry, so that domes-
tic competition is weak. We argue in Section III that protection is likely to intensify competition among
existing firms in an industry with vigorous domestic competition and may also encourage new entry.
25WTO website: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm (accessed May 18, 2004).
The Agreement on Agriculture contains separate and more lenient rules on subsidies to agricultural exports.indicates the number of industry-wide requests for U.S. government intervention
during the period indicated. However, TAAfor displaced workers shows the num-
ber of petitions from individual workers, and TAA for firms shows the number of
individual firms certified to receive benefits.
From the standpoint of the adjustment environment created by U.S. trade reme-
dies, it is relevant to know whether the workers, firms, and industries that request
assistance under the various programs are the ones facing the greatest pressure to
adjust to changing conditions in the international market. Are frequent users of
trade remedies encountering greater pressure from increased imports relative to
other U.S. industries? Is their revealed comparative advantage declining relative
to other U.S. industries? To address these questions, we refer to Table 2.
Table 2 provides a simple comparison of import-penetration ratios and revealed
compared advantage (RCA) of petitioners versus non-petitioners for three of these
programs.26 Consider first the data on the mean and median industry-level import-
penetration ratios for petitioning and non-petitioning industries. For each of the
three programs in the table (safeguards, TAA, antidumping), we would expect peti-
tioning industries to be associated with higher levels of import penetration than
non-petitioners, as well as with larger increases in import penetration over the five-
year period prior to the petition being filed. With the exception of the change in
import penetration ratios for antidumping, that is exactly the qualitative pattern we
observe in the first two columns. The second two columns of Table 2 provide data
on the industry-level RCA variables. For each of the three programs in the table,
we would expect petitioning industries to be associated with lower levels of RCA
than non-petitioners, as well as with larger decreases over the five-year period prior
to the petition being filed. Again, the qualitative pattern of the results (the means
and medians of the data for petitioning versus non-petitioning industries) is consis-
tent with that hypothesis.
We conclude from this rough empirical exercise that the industries that face,
or should face, adjustment to changing global market conditions are more likely
than other industries to seek help under the trade remedies discussed above. Thus,
the adjustment environment created by these laws may play a significant role in
determining the speed of adjustment and also the cost of adjustment.
III. Trade Remedies and Adjustment
In this section we consider within-industry developments in three cases of adjust-
ment shaped by U.S. protection: the U.S. auto industry under the voluntary export
restraints that limited U.S. imports from Japan, the steel industry under a succes-
sion of protective devices, and the textile and apparel industries under the Multifiber
Arrangement. All have benefited from import relief under one or more of the laws
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26Import penetration ratio is defined as (imports) / (imports + shipments – exports), where all data are
at the four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) level. Following Richardson and Zhang (1999),
we define RCA as [(U.S. exports of industry i) / (U.S. total exports)] / [(World exports of industry i) /
(World total exports)], where industry i’s data are defined at the four-digit Standard International 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chad P. Bown and Rachel McCullochdiscussed above. A common feature in the three cases is that protection created a
profitable opportunity for new entry into the domestic industry. Although industry
decline was slowed, new entry increased pressure on firms and workers already in
the industry.
With the exception of TAA, the policies discussed in Sections I and II are
intended to afford some degree of protection of the domestic industry from com-
peting imports. Even when acknowledging the costs of protection to consumers
and downstream industries, proponents of trade remedies justify their use in terms of
anticipated favorable effects on domestic output, employment, earnings, and income
distribution. There is often the hope that increased profitability may encourage firms
in a protected industry to make investments required to adopt new technologies.
Yet the actual effects on firms and workers in protected industries are complex,
and policies are often ineffective in attaining their stated goals.
Baldwin (1982 and 1985) catalogs a number of now-familiar reasons why pro-
tection of an industry may cause a smaller reduction in imports and a smaller associ-
ated increase in domestic output and employment than anticipated. Country-specific
trade remedies such as antidumping measures and countervailing duties encourage
diversion of trade to as-yet unrestricted alternative import sources, a response docu-
mented for products ranging from textiles and apparel to automobiles.27 Trade may
also be diverted to related products or product forms not covered by the restriction.
Consumers faced with higher prices may shift their demand to now-cheaper sub-
stitutes. Downstream users can sometimes shift production offshore to avoid higher
domestic prices, as in the case of laptop producers affected by U.S. antidumping
duties on flat-panel displays (Irwin, 2002, p. 80). U.S. industrial users of highly pro-
tected sugar shifted to alternative sweeteners; under NAFTA some candy manufac-
turers moved production to Canada and Mexico. When protected by a quantitative
restriction on imports, a domestic supplier with market power may find it profitable
to produce less rather than more output and thus may reduce rather than increase
employment. Faced with quantitative trade restrictions or specific rather than ad val-
orem tariffs in the U.S. market, foreign suppliers often find it profitable to upgrade
the quality of their exports, a response documented for Korean footwear as well as
Japanese autos.
Even more important in the longer term are induced changes in the structure of
the domestic industry. By limiting imports, trade restrictions raise the output price
and thus rate of return in the protected industry. With fixed domestic capacity, this
would translate into higher output and higher employment for existing firms, slow-
ing down their exit from the industry. But protection may also make new entry (or
expansion by existing firms) attractive. One such response is foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) by companies that had previously served the market through exports.
Whatever its source, expanded capacity increases competitive pressure within the
domestic industry.
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27Dinopoulos and Kreinin (1988) estimate that unrestricted European producers were major benefi-
ciaries of the auto VER; the limit on Japanese sales in the United States allowed European exporters to
raise their prices by one-third.Autos
The VER limiting Japanese auto exports to the United States played a key role in
accelerating FDI by Japanese firms during the 1980s. Contradicting the widespread
belief that Japanese success relied on country-specific conditions not likely to be
replicated in U.S. factories, Japanese “transplants” claimed an increasing share of
the domestic market; other foreign companies later followed suit. Struggling to com-
pete, U.S. producers gradually introduced some of the same managerial and tech-
nological approaches believed to account for Japanese success. The United Auto
Workers were forced to accept contract terms that allowed the traditional “Big Three”
American auto producers to compete more effectively with the nonunion Japanese-
owned assembly plants.
While foreign-controlled U.S. plants augmented total domestic auto produc-
tion and employment compared with a situation in which the same autos were
supplied through imports, protection-jumping FDI also brought about significant
changes within the industry that are not apparent from aggregate performance
measures. The most fundamental change is a continuing decline in the market share
of the Big Three and their unions—protection has helped the domestic industry
much more than it has helped the United Auto Workers and the firms that asked for
protection.28 For the 2003 fiscal year, Toyota’s earnings were more than the Big
Three U.S. companies combined.29 The newer plants are mostly far from Detroit,
and their workers are not unionized. All U.S. producers now import a larger share
of intermediate inputs used in assembling autos. And, as in U.S. manufacturing
overall, industry employment has been falling relative to output, thus raising output
per worker.30
Steel
For decades American steel producers have been protected from competing imports
by an arsenal of special trade restrictions including voluntary restraint agreements,
the trigger-price mechanism, and the recent safeguard tariffs. Iron and steel products
accounted for 41 percent of all U.S. antidumping duties in effect as of June 2000
(Irwin, 2002, p. 117). As in autos, protection stimulated U.S. direct investment by for-
eign companies with superior technologies. Much of this investment took the form of
mergers and acquisitions involving domestic integrated mills. But in steel, additional
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28Ironically, the United Auto Workers, then headed by Doug Fraser, favored an auto VER precisely
because of the belief that it would stimulate Japanese FDI. However, Fraser also believed that the Japanese
advantage could not be duplicated under U.S. production conditions.
29Danny Hakim, “The Big Three Fear That Toyota Is Becoming the Big One,” The New York Times,
May 20, 2004, p. C1.
30Krueger (2004) comments that U.S. protection in autos “simply postponed the restructuring of the
industry. . . . This resulted in thousands of jobs lost—the jobs the protection had been intended to save.”
In fact, protection may actually speed the loss of existing jobs by increasing the profitability of new entry.
To the extent that protection induces investment in new capacity or equipment, the net change in employ-
ment at the industry level understates the degree of labor-market dislocation and associated adverse effects
on communities. In the auto industry, new capacity and new jobs in Japanese transplants were located far
from the homes of the workers displaced from Big Three plants.new competition in the domestic market came from the growth of nonunion mini-
mills. With the combined benefits of lower labor costs, lower capital requirements,
and higher productivity, mini-mills had captured about 40 percent of U.S. domestic
production by 1994, up from less than 10 percent in the 1960s (Tornell, 1997). As in
autos, protection could maintain the industry’s output level but could not preserve
jobs, especially jobs in the integrated mills. Overall, the number of American steel
jobs plummeted. Although unions managed to keep wages in the integrated mills ris-
ing faster than manufacturing wages overall, nonunion mini-mill workers captured an
ever-increasing share of the jobs in the industry.
Textiles and Apparel
Even when FDI is not an important factor, trade remedies may induce substantial
changes within the domestic industry. The extent of induced change within a declin-
ing but protected sector is well illustrated by the case of textiles and apparel. Textile
imports from Japan had already begun to threaten the U.S. industry before World
War II. A 1956 VER on Japanese exports of cotton textiles to the United States
paved the way for entry by other exporters and other fibers. Efforts to control trade
diversion eventually produced the Multifiber Arrangement, “the single most impor-
tant barrier to developing country exports of manufactures” (Pearson, 2004, p. 61),
which was finally terminated in 2005. Yet despite escalating protection at rising cost
to domestic consumers,31 imports continued their inexorable rise. Between 1972
and 1997, the real value of textile imports nearly tripled, while apparel imports soared
by a factor of 10 (Levinsohn and Petropoulos, 2001, Table 1).
Not surprisingly, the number of U.S. plants and industry employment fell over
the same period. But even within the context of overall decline, new plants opened
at nearly the same rate that established plants closed. From 1987 to 1992, the aver-
age gross rate of exit of plants in textiles was 31 percent, while the average gross
rate of plant entry was 28 percent; the corresponding numbers over the same period
for apparel were 46 percent and 49 percent (Levinsohn and Petropoulos, 2001, Table
3). These large gross rates reflect relocation within the United States, as textile pro-
ducers all but abandoned high-cost locations in New England in favor of southern
and border states. Apparel manufacturing likewise shifted from its traditional east-
ern base in New England and New York to the south, Texas, and California, as immi-
grants from Asia and Latin America replaced the immigrants from Europe who were
once the mainstay of the labor force in the apparel industry.
Levinsohn and Petropoulos conclude that “in a probabilistic sense, inefficient
firms die.” After controlling for size of plant, wages paid, capital stock per worker,
and measures of outsourcing, firms with lower productivity are more likely to exit.
“Those who worry that the crazy-quilt of protection afforded by the MFA allows
inefficient plants to prosper while protecting them from the realities of the world
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31Hufbauer and Elliott (1994) estimate the 1990 cost to consumers at $24 billion, or around $1 million
per “job saved” in the industries. Yet even this figure may be too low, as the calculation is based on net
industry employment. Given the huge rates of gross job loss reported by Levinsohn and Petropoulos (2001),
the cost per worker not displaced from current employment would be far higher.marketplace should find some solace in this result.” Yet substantial continuing invest-
ment and new hires in these secularly shrinking industries raise other concerns. The
“creative destruction” in the protected domestic textile and apparel industries illus-
trates the pernicious effect of protection for highly competitive industries that are los-
ing comparative advantage. As expected, protection raises prices and profitability in
the domestic industries. Higher profitability can promote new investment, thus retard-
ing the pace of adjustment at the industry level. However, the induced increase in
competition within the domestic market can actually accelerate the forced exit of
current plants and workers—the latter attributable both to plant closings and to
adoption of new capital-intensive and skill-intensive technologies that raise output
per worker. Thus, protection intended to offset the adjustment pressure on domestic
firms and workers may have exactly the opposite effect.
IV. Conclusions
Our purpose in this paper is to highlight the role of U.S. trade policies in facilitat-
ing or retarding adjustment to changing conditions in international markets. Given
that the main rationale for most trade policy is to afford protection of particular
industrial sectors under specific circumstances, it is perhaps not surprising to find
that these statutes contain few provisions that are even neutral with respect to
adjustment, let alone ones likely to facilitate or encourage adjustment. Likewise,
given that action under trade laws is usually contingent on evidence of injury that
can be linked to imports, it is not surprising to find that the U.S. industries most
likely to seek help under these laws are the industries faced with the greatest chal-
lenge from international competition and thus the ones most in need of adjust-
ment. There is scant evidence that these policies help to facilitate adjustment by
correcting market distortions, while in many instances they are the cause of addi-
tional market distortions.
Together, these findings underscore a critical gap in U.S. trade laws and pro-
cedures. The trade statutes contain no acknowledgement that the most common
reason for injury due to import competition is shifting comparative advantage, and
no U.S. trade policy is specifically aimed at promoting adjustment to such shifts.
Indeed, the federal agencies charged with the responsibility for providing relief to
industries facing injury from foreign competition seem to lack any significant
accompanying role in promoting adjustment out of these industries.
Moreover, industry-specific protection is likely to induce changes at the firm
level that prolong the adjustment process and increase total adjustment costs. By
raising the rate of return on invested capital, protection can draw new capital and
workers into a secularly shrinking industry. This induced entry adds to the pressure
on existing plants and workers while at the same time creating a new set of future
“losers” to oppose future liberalization. Through familiar general-equilibrium link-
ages, the same process discourages growth of the nation’s comparative-advantage
sectors. Moreover, by limiting access to the huge American market, U.S. protection
inhibits the growth of corresponding industries abroad. Failure to adjust to shifting
comparative advantage is thus costly not only to the United States, but also to its
current and future trading partners and especially to developing countries.
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age speedy exit from industries that have lost their comparative advantage. Free
trade would have exactly this effect, but political considerations make some diver-
gence from “the free-trade policies that would probably best serve the broad public
interest” almost inevitable (Mussa, 1993, p. 374). How then to design a politically
acceptable policy instrument that will “keep the damage to a minimum” by promot-
ing adjustment to changing conditions rather than discouraging it? And how, in the
absence of unfettered trade, to identify appropriate targets for adjustment? This may
be a difficult issue to settle generically, but the policy could begin by identifying
industries that owe their survival to perennial import relief. Such industries have
become increasingly evident, thanks to successive rounds of multilateral liberaliza-
tion and rapid improvements in communications and transportation.
Finally, although this paper has focused on U.S. trade policy, the problem of
sluggish adjustment is hardly unique to the United States; the industrial countries as
a group have been slow to adjust to shifting comparative advantage. The Uruguay
Round laid ground for future progress on collective adjustment by bringing apparel,
textiles, and agriculture, all areas of strong comparative advantage for developing
countries, into the WTO. Likewise, the Doha Round has centered on the needs of
developing countries for increased market access. Yet so far the WTO has offered
little in the way of guidance regarding the necessary companion agenda of adjust-
ment out of the same industries in the industrial countries.
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